Toward a Commonsense Answer to the Special Composition Carmichael – – Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (3) Alvin Plantinga: John A. O’Brien Professor of Philosophy Emeritus at Notre Dame University I give two arguments against materialism. A NEW ARGUMENT AGAINST MATERIALISM. ALVIN PLANTINGA. PLENARY ADDRESS FOR THE EVANGELICAL PHILOSOPHICAL.
|Published (Last):||21 December 2008|
|PDF File Size:||20.41 Mb|
|ePub File Size:||5.81 Mb|
|Price:||Free* [*Free Regsitration Required]|
The first is an argument from possibility: Even if reductive materialism were true, beliefs appear to cause behavior by virtue of their NP properties, not by their semantic content. He thinks it is hard to account for beliefs and content under materialism but he also thinks that dualism is not better off. While I have a degree of sympathy for this project, I see a lot of dissatisfying argument from intuition here.
If the modal properties are different, then those two things are not identical. If materialism is true, then I am a material object. We have an understanding of numbers.
Which life events are essential to Al? I can imagine a world in which it is true. This is why I hate analytic philosophy. Why should I think that the inversion of your brain does not constitute an essential change in you? That’s a more complex state space that can’t be mapped to any one of them. Just because it seems thinkable that you should not notice the change? I mean, does that satisfy anyone?
And since you are simply wrong about the implications of this rejection re: On Formulating Materialism and Dualism. Indeed, what kind of intuition would even support such an idea?
Alvin Plantinga – Against Materialism
Someone a hundred years in the future reads the book, and duplicates the process programmed in the recipe. If a process lacking semantics can recover some semantic properties, then there’s good reason to think that such a process could eventually capture all semantic properties. This qgainst has no associated abstract.
When Plantinga imagines his body replaced with different but functionally identical matter, and then presumes that there is a moment between the replacement where he has no body and yet his consciousness still exists, and therefore is not material, I wonder where he expects all that information that defines the particular relationships between his particles to be stored?
The kind that reduces to monism, and the kind that is so useless as to be self-defeating. Cale April 2, at 7: Perhaps all the information in one hemisphere is transferred through the corpus callosum to the other hemisphere, the former replaced, the transfer performed again, and ta-da!: The problem for materialism, and the main point of this argument, is consciousness itself.
Spieler – – Personalist 58 April: Start here About this Blog. Discussion of suicide is only allowed in the abstract here. Check out “Why I am Not a Dualist” on her recent papers page. Faith and Philosophy 23 1: What Physicalism Does Not Entail.
Finally, materialists no longer need good rational arguments, because we have the entire weight of modern science on our side.
Alvin Plantinga, Against materialism – PhilPapers
If materialism is true then human beings are just one substance. My brain, unlike a HDD, has thoughts and can have objects of consciousness.
Reply Parent Thread Expand Link. It’s not the same chair.
This argument could possibly go somewhere, but it is not a sufficient response to van Inwagen to stamp your feet and pout ” We are not the brain, be are the change in the brain over time Email required Address never made public. Surely whatever is performing the transition must be capturing and recording all that information and then restoring it.
What do you guys think? Fill in your details below or click an icon to log in: