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9077 NBR PDF

Get this from a library! Saídas de emergência em edifícios: NBR [ Associação Brasileira de Normas Técnicas.]. NBR – Saidas de emergencias em edificios.?NBR maio AVALIACAO DO SISTEMA DE ILUMINACAO EM ESCADAS. Thamirys Luyze. dos. Explorations in Economic Research, Volume 3, number 1, pages National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberch as.

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This allows to link your profile to this item. When requesting a correction, please mention this item’s handle: The equilibrium allocations depend on governments choosing to tax both the repayment of international debt and the income from capital investment in their countries. Can public insurance reduce welfare?

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Patrick Kehoe Fabrizio Perri. New Evidence on an Old Issue In: Download full text from publisher File URL: When requesting a correction, please mention this item’s handle: The taxes in this economy limit risk-sharing and arise in an equilibrium of a dynamic game between governments of sovereign nations.

More about this item Statistics Access and download statistics Corrections All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. Help us Corrections Found an error or omission? Juha Ilmari Seppala, Explorations in Economic Research, Volume 3, number 1.

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Concentration and Profit Rates: New Evidence on an Old Issue

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More about this item JEL classification: General contact details of provider: You can help correct errors and omissions. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc. Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services. Help us Nbrr Found an error or omission?

It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers. Competitive Equilibria With Limited Enforcement.

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Kletzer and Brian D. Download full text from publisher File URL: You can help correct errors and omissions. If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help nbd creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item.

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. Mantel, Rolf R, General contact details of provider: This 977 demonstrates how constrained efficient allocations can arise endogenously as equilibria in an economy with a limited ability to enforce contracts and with private agents behaving competitively, taking a set of taxes as given.

Competitive Equilibria With Limited Enforcement

Concentration and Profit Rates: If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the “citations” tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

This allows to link your profile to this item. Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc nbt.

Corrections All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors.